Slick Packets by Nguyen, Giang T. K. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
1.
16
61
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 8 
Ja
n 2
01
2
Slick Packets
Giang T. K. Nguyen
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, USA
nguyen59@illinois.edu
Rachit Agarwal
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, USA
agarwa16@illinois.edu
Junda Liu
University of California
at Berkeley, USA
liujd@cs.berkeley.edu
Matthew Caesar
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, USA
caesar@illinois.edu
P. Brighten Godfrey
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, USA
pbg@illinois.edu
Scott Shenker
University of California
at Berkeley, USA
shenker@cs.berkeley.edu
Abstract
Source-controlled routing has been proposed as a way to
improve flexibility of future network architectures, as well
as simplifying the data plane. However, if a packet spec-
ifies its path, this precludes fast local re-routing within
the network. We propose SlickPackets, a novel solution
that allows packets to slip around failures by specifying
alternate paths in their headers, in the form of compactly-
encoded directed acyclic graphs. We show that this can
be accomplished with reasonably small packet headers for
real network topologies, and results in responsiveness to
failures that is competitive with past approaches that re-
quire much more state within the network. Our approach
thus enables fast failure response while preserving the
benefits of source-controlled routing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional routing protocols are network-controlled:
routes are computed within the network, with each router
picking, from among its neighbors, the next-hop to each
destination. Examples include BGP for interdomain rout-
ing, and OSPF for intradomain routing. An alternate
paradigm, source-controlled routing (SCR), improves
the flexibility of the network architecture. Rather than
computing all routes within the network, SCR architec-
tures [10, 20, 28–30] reserve some choice of routes for the
sources1 to select on a per-packet basis. The uses of SCR’s
routing flexibility are quite diverse. Sources can observe
end-to-end reliability problems and switch to a working
path within a few round-trip times (RTTs); pick better-
performing routes based on observed performance [5, 11,
24]; improve load balance since path selection is finer-
grained [23]; encourage competition among network pro-
viders [7]; improve security [27]; or optimize for other
application-specific objectives. SCR is thus a promising
approach to improve the flexibility of the network layer
in future Internet architectures.
However, one remaining problem is that of fast failure
reaction. This problem arose in early network-controlled
routing (NCR) protocols, which suffered from unrelia-
bility during network dynamics: during the distributed
This is an extended version of a paper that appeared in
ACM SIGMETRICS 2011. Supporting code is available
at http://code.google.com/p/slick-packets/
1In this paper, we use“source” to refer either to end-hosts
or to edge routers acting on their behalf.
convergence process, packets could enter “black holes” or
loops, resulting in tens of seconds or minutes of downtime
in Internet end-to-end paths [14,26]. Treating these basic
protocols as a baseline, two high-level approaches have
been proposed to improve failure reaction.
The first approach works within the NCR paradigm
by computing an alternate path to each destination (or
IP prefix or AS); a router can locally switch to the alter-
nate path without waiting for a control-plane convergence
process. Packets can thus be delivered continuously, ex-
cept for the minimal time it takes for a router to detect
failure of one of its directly connected links and locally
switch to an alternate path. Examples include MPLS
Fast Reroute [22], SafeGuard [18], and FCP [17] for in-
tradomain routing, and R-BGP [16] for interdomain rout-
ing. However, this approach lacks the routing flexibility
of SCR.
A second approach to improve failure reaction is to
leverage SCR’s routing flexibility: a source can switch
routes without waiting for the Internet’s control plane to
reconverge. While this improves failure reaction time rel-
ative to the baseline above, the source still must wait to
receive notice of the failure. Regardless of the means of
notification, this will take at least on the order of one
RTT, which at Internet scales would be much slower than
the first approach of using NCR with alternate paths.
And in the SCR proposals that provide the most flexibil-
ity [10,29], sources specify in the packet header an explicit
route (perhaps at the level of autonomous systems) rather
than a destination, so the NCR and SCR techniques can-
not be immediately combined.
The goal of this paper is to achieve the best of two
worlds: the fast failure reaction of alternate routes em-
bedded within the network, and the flexibility of routes
chosen by sources at the edge of the network. To meet
this goal, we work within the SCR paradigm, but with a
twist. Instead of specifying a single path to the destina-
tion, the packet header contains a directed acyclic graph
that we call the forwarding subgraph (FS). Each router
along the packet’s path may choose to forward it along
any of the outgoing links at that router’s node in the
FS (optionally preferring a path marked as the primary),
with no danger of causing a forwarding loop. This ap-
proach, which we call SlickPackets, allows packets to
“slip” around failures in-flight while retaining the flexibil-
ity of source route control. Moreover, SlickPackets pro-
vides a scalability benefit over NCR with alternate paths:
rather than requiring multiple routes to every destination
in every router’s forwarding table, SlickPackets routers
need only local information.
Of course, our approach also presents several challenges.
Chief among these is how to encode an FS with suffi-
cient path diversity into the small space afforded by a
packet header. We introduce techniques through which
the FS can be encoded compactly enough for our mech-
anism to be feasible. For example, an FS providing an
alternate path at every hop along the primary occupies
less than 26 bytes for 99% of evaluated source-destination
pairs in an AS-level Internet map, and no higher than 50
bytes in all evaluated cases. Thus, the technique incurs
manageable overhead for applications that send packets
of moderate to large size. We also demonstrate through a
simulation-based performance evaluation that SlickPac-
kets achieves failure reaction performance that is com-
parable to the best of NCR architectures [18].
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In §2, we
present an overview of SlickPackets and its principal
design challenges. §3 gives a detailed presentation of the
SlickPackets design. We evaluate the performance of
our design in terms of header size and failure reaction in
§4. We discuss extensions of SlickPackets in §5 and
related work in §6, and conclude in §7.
2. OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide an overview of SlickPac-
kets, and discuss several critical design challenges.
SlickPackets is a failure reaction mechanism for SCR
protocols. In contrast to traditional SCR protocols that
specify a single path in the packet header, SlickPac-
kets enables fast recovery within the network by allowing
the source to embed the rerouting information within the
packet header in the form of a forwarding subgraph
(FS). The FS specifies a set of paths that intermediate
routers can use to reroute packets in case of failures. The
source, if it desires, can designate one of these paths as
the primary path to be used in the absence of failure;
the rest of the paths are then treated as alternate paths
that can be used if the primary path is not available. In
order to avoid forwarding loops, SlickPackets requires
that the FS be a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Performing forwarding in this way has two main ben-
efits. First, since the source specifies the FS, it has full
control of not only the primary path, but also how the
network forwards the packet when the primary path is
not available. Second, since alternate path information
is embedded directly in the packet header, the network
can react immediately without requiring involvement of
the source, which reduces the reaction time in presence of
link failures. In addition to these two benefits, the task
of a router becomes simpler: a router requires only local
knowledge of its neighbors, rather than needing an alter-
nate path for every destination (which may require infor-
mation such as the multi-homing locations of each host).
In summary, SlickPackets achieves key benefits of SCR
architectures (flexibility in route selection and scalability
of network routing state) while simultaneously attaining
failure reaction performance that is comparable to that of
NCR architectures with backup paths.
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Figure 1: Overview of the SlickPackets design.
Step I: the source selects a forwarding subgraph
(FS) based on the topology of the physical net-
work; Step II: the source encodes and embeds the
FS in the packet header to inform routers how to
route around encountered failures; and Step III:
routers forward the packet based on the FS con-
tained in the packet header.
Fig. 1 shows an example to illustrate the design of
SlickPackets. Suppose the source s wishes to send a
packet to a destination d. The source has acquired, by
some mechanism to be discussed later, a map of the net-
work. It selects the FS as shown in Fig. 1 and designates
(s,R1, R2, R5, d) to be the primary path. Note that the
FS provides each node on the primary path with suffi-
cient alternatives so that if a link on the primary path
fails, the packet can be rerouted to the destination. Next,
s constructs a data packet with the subgraph embedded
in the packet header, and forwards it on to the first-hop
R1. At R1, the packet is forwarded to the next-hop on
the primary path (R2). Now suppose that at R2 the pri-
mary path’s next hop R5 lies across a failed link (R2, R5);
then R2 forwards the packet to R4, the next-hop on its
alternate path in the FS, after which the packet continues
to R5 and finally d.
Realizing the high level idea of source-controlled rout-
ing along an FS, however, involves several key challenges.
We outline these challenges and our solutions here.
Obtaining the map. Like other SCR architectures in
which sources construct end-to-end paths, our sources re-
quire a map of the available links. When deploying Slick-
Packets as an interdomain routing protocol, this imme-
diately raises questions of scalability and policy compli-
ance. Is it feasible to push a map of the Internet, at some
level of granularity, to every source or at least every edge
router? Is there an acceptable way to balance control of
network resources between the senders and the network
owners? Fortunately, we can adopt the solutions devel-
oped by past work, in particular NIRA [29] and path-
let routing [10], which have shown how maps of policy-
compliant transit service can be constructed and dissem-
inated in ways that can be much more scalable than tra-
ditional NCR protocols like BGP.
Packet header overhead. The next challenge is to
design an efficient encoding mechanism that embeds the
FS into the packet header with minimal overhead. By
using link labels with only local significance and allocat-
ing every bit carefully, we are able to achieve acceptable
packet header sizes on realistic network topologies.
Fast data-plane operations. Another challenge is to
design an efficient data plane forwarding algorithm: the
encoding and forwarding mechanisms in SlickPackets
should minimize next-hop lookup time without substan-
tially increasing header processing cost, forwarding de-
lay and/or design complexity of modern router forward-
ing planes. Fortunately, forwarding along an FS requires
only lookup and pointer-increment operations, as in stan-
dard SCR protocols, and can be efficiently implemented
in practice.
The next section discusses our design in more detail,
including our solutions to these challenges.
3. SLICKPACKETS DESIGN
In this section, we present in more detail the four main
components of SlickPackets: definition and dissemina-
tion of the network map (§3.1); selection of a forwarding
subgraph (FS) at the source (§3.2); encoding of the FS
into the packet header (§3.3); and the data plane for-
warding mechanism at routers (§3.4).
The SlickPackets approach could be applied in multi-
ple contexts. We describe here how the design can be ap-
plied to interdomain and intradomain routing. The differ-
ences principally lie in map dissemination and data plane
forwarding, with the core approach taking the same form
in both contexts.
3.1 Map format and dissemination
As in other SCR protocols in which the source composes
end-to-end paths [10, 29], in SlickPackets, the source
must obtain a network “map” (topology) from which it
can construct paths. This map is an abstract directed
graph in which each directed directed link (u, v) at node
node u is annotated with a label. The label is a compact,
variable-length bitstring, which the source will use when
encoding the FS (§ 3.3) to tell node u that it wants u to
use the link (u, v). Similar to an MPLS label, the label
identifies a link only locally at u, not globally. Thus, u
will generally announce labels of length ⌈log2 δ(u)⌉ bits
where δ(u) is the degree of u.
What this map corresponds to in the physical network
and how the map is disseminated depend on the deploy-
ment scenario. In an intradomain environment, the map
would correspond to the physical topology of routers and
links and could be distributed via a protocol like OSPF
or through a centralized coordinator as in [17].
In an interdomain environment, we have to deal with
the significant challenges of scalability and network own-
ers’ transit policies. In order to overcome these challenges,
we build on solutions developed in past work and briefly
describe them here for completeness.
Basic approach. Both NIRA [29] and pathlet rout-
ing [10] provide sources with a policy-compliant map of
the Internet, roughly at the autonomous system (AS)
level. NIRA’s map assumes common customer-provider-
peer relationships between ASes and allows a subset of
valley-free routes: that is, packets travel up a chain of
providers, potentially across a peering link, and down
a chain of customers to the destination. Pathlet rout-
ing represents this map explicitly as an arbitrary vir-
tual topology, whose edges (pathlets) represent policy-
compliant transit service.
Scalability. NIRA, while dependent on the existence of
a typical AS business hierarchy, offers the opportunity of
vastly improving BGP’s control plane scalability. Rather
than learning an Internet-wide topology, each node learns
its“up-graph”of routes through providers, stopping at the
“core” of the Internet. The up-graph requires fewer than
20 entries for 90% of domains [29], many orders of mag-
nitude less than the roughly 300,000 prefixes that BGP
propagates today. Each destination stores its up-graph
in a global DNS-like database; to route to a destination,
a source queries the database and combines its own up-
graph with the destination’s up-graph. Though the re-
sulting map is a small fraction of the Internet, it includes
all policy-compliant (valley-free) routes. Pathlet routing
could use a NIRA-style approach for disseminating the
pathlet topology, or it can be disseminated via a BGP-
like mechanism with slightly more messaging and control
state (≤ 1.7×) than traditional BGP.
SlickPackets can take advantage of either the pathlet
or NIRA approach for interdomain map dissemination.
Thus, SlickPackets does not require a source to have
complete topological knowledge of the network, but rather
only enough to construct a path and alternate paths to
the destination.
We also note that SlickPackets, like other SCR and
multipath routing architectures, can benefit from signifi-
cantly reduced rate of control plane updates [6] compared
with basic single-path NCR architectures. This is because
short-lived failures need not be disseminated through the
control plane, since failure reaction will happen anyway
via forwarding along alternate paths without waiting for
control-plane updates.
Link labels. Along with the map itself, SlickPackets
requires labels on the links. Routers (or ASes for interdo-
main; for convenience we’ll use “routers” in what follows)
can piggyback this information with the link advertise-
ments [10]. To change a label, a router readvertises the
link. While readvertisements increase control traffic, we
expect that changing a router’s link labels will be fairly
rare, for two reasons. First, the operator could change
a single label from one bit sequence to another; however,
there should be little need for such changes because the la-
bels are arbitrary identifiers with no significance. Second,
the operator may need to increase the number of links ex-
iting the router. This may increase the label length and
require readvertisements of all of the router’s link labels,
creating a period of inconsistency from when the router
changes its label length to when sources receive the up-
dated announcement. However, label lengths change only
once every time the number of outgoing links doubles (or
halves) in size, which is expected to be a very rare event.
An alternate approach is to make labels self-describing:
their first few bits encode the label length [10]. This
avoids the need to readvertise links after a length change
and the resulting inconsistency, but labels become slightly
longer. Since compactness is important for SlickPac-
kets, we do not evaluate this approach in this paper.
Map consistency. A natural question is whether all
sources and the network must have an entirely consistent
view of the map at all times. Fortunately, this difficult
task is unnecessary. There are three possible types of
inconsistency.
First, if a source uses a non-existent label (e.g., the link
has been removed or its label changed), this is equivalent
to a link failure and the packet can be re-routed along
an alternate path. To avoid even this minor disturbance,
routers can insert a short delay between announcing a
label deletion and its removal from forwarding tables.
Second, if a source uses a label that has changed to
identify a different link, then the packet will follow an
incorrect path and will be unlikely to reach its intended
destination. This is similar to inconsistency problems in
basic NCR protocols. (Unlike in basic NCR protocols,
however, the packet cannot get into a loop of any signifi-
cant length because one link in the DAG will be consumed
at each hop.) To avoid label-change inconsistency, routers
can simply use new labels rather than reusing ones that
have recently had a different meaning.
Third, a source might be unaware of some valid labels.
This simply results in a slightly restricted set of options
until it receives the relevant control plane advertisement,
as in essentially any other distributed routing protocol.
Thus, in all cases, inconsistency issues can be mitigated.
3.2 Selection of the forwarding subgraph
Once a source has obtained the network map, it se-
lects a forwarding subgraph (FS) along which it desires
the packet to be routed in the network. The FS is a
DAG corresponding to a subset of nodes and links in the
network map. The directed edges inform routers of the
packet’s allowed next-hops, and acyclicity ensures there
are no forwarding loops. Additionally, for each node in
the FS, the source may mark one outgoing link as the
preferred primary.
Sources have a great deal of flexibility in how they
choose an FS. For instance, the source may select an FS
that avoids any single link failure along a low-latency pri-
mary path, avoids node failures, optimizes for other met-
rics like bandwidth, or picks alternate paths that avoid
shared risk link groups. We discuss some of these uses
in §5. For concreteness, we describe here and evaluate
in §4 how the source can pick an FS that will minimize
primary-path latency and provide alternate paths to avoid
any single link failure. As noted below, accommodating
shared risk link groups is similar.
A source s, for a given destination d, constructs a single-
failure-avoiding FS as follows. First, s computes a pri-
mary path P to d by running a shortest path algorithm
over the network map. Next, s visits each link along P ,
and computes the alternate path Pi it would prefer the
packet to be routed along if that link were to fail. In
particular, for each node vi on the primary path, we (a)
remove vi’s outgoing edge corresponding to its next hop
along the primary path; (b) compute a shortest path from
vi to d, not using the removed outgoing edge; and (c) re-
store the removed edge. In case of a node having multiple
shortest paths to the destination, the source may arbitrar-
s R1
R2
R3
R4 d
(a) Network map
s R1
R′1
R2
R3
R4 d
(b) Forwarding subgraph
Figure 2: An FS may have multiple representa-
tions of a network map node, to allow “backtrack-
ing” without introducing cycles in the FS.
ily select one of these shortest paths. Finally, the primary
and the alternate paths are assembled into the FS. Note
that the above algorithm requires |P | runs of Dijkstra’s
algorithm. Surprisingly, it is possible to construct a pri-
mary path and all the alternate paths in a single run of a
shortest-path algorithm; see [12].
Beyond single-link-failure protection, a source may want
to protect against failures of shared risk link groups (i.e.,
sets of links that are likely to have correlated failures,
such as multiple logical links allocated to a single physi-
cal fiber). Assuming it has knowledge of these groups, it
can do this by removing all links in the group in substep
(a) above, and restoring them all in (c).
Note that there is a subtlety in how the the primary
and the alternate paths are “assembled” into the FS: if
we simply take the union of all these links and edges, we
might create a loop, violating the acyclicity requirement.
Consider the network map in Fig. 2(a). Assume that s
desires to use (s,R1, R3, R4, d) as the primary path. Then
to escape a failure of the link (R3, R4), a packet located at
R3 must follow the path (R3, R1, R2, R4, d). Taking the
union of these primary and alternate paths would result
in a loop R1 → R3 → R1. Due to symmetry, the problem
persists if (s,R1, R2, R4, d) is the primary path.
In order to avoid such loops, when adding an alternate
path edge (u, v) to the FS, we first check to see if this
would cause a loop. If so, we create a second FS rep-
resentation v′ of the physical node v, and add the edge
(u, v′). This can be seen as “tunneling” the packet back
along an alternate path. In the example of Fig. 2, before
adding the second alternate path, we create a new copy
R′1 corresponding to the node R1. The alternate path
then follows (R3, R
′
1, R2, R4, d), resulting in a acyclic rep-
resentation of the FS as shown in Fig. 2(b).
3.3 Encoding the forwarding subgraph
After choosing an FS, the source must encode the FS
into a sequence of bits and place it in the packet header.
SlickPackets is agnostic to the particular location this
header appears in the packet (for example, it may reside
in a “shim” header between the IP and MAC layers, in an
IP option, or in a novel header format in a next-generation
Internet protocol). There are two key goals in designing
an encoding format: (a) minimizing the size of the re-
sulting encoding; and (b) ensuring data plane forwarding
operations are simple. We designed and evaluated several
encoding formats to achieve these goals.
In this paper we present two encoding formats, called
Direct and Default. Each may result in a smaller encoding
in certain scenarios as discussed below. But the latter re-
S1 S2 . . . Sk
p 〈code〉 〈length〉 d1 . . . dℓ
Figure 3: Default encoding format layout. Si is
the segment corresponding to node vi on the pri-
mary path. It encodes the node’s primary next
hop p and alternate path (d1, d2, . . . , dℓ). 〈length〉
specifies the bit-length of the alternate path, and
〈code〉 specifies the bit-length of the 〈length〉 field.
sulted in smaller encoding sizes in the network topologies
we evaluated using the single-failure-avoiding FS selection
(§3.2), so it is our default.
Direct format. The Direct format encodes the FS di-
rectly, in the sense that the FS’s DAG data structure in
memory is essentially directly serialized into a DAG data
structure in the packet header. The header contains a
sequence of node representations, each containing one or
more outgoing link representations; each link representa-
tion contains its corresponding label and a pointer to an-
other node within the header, corresponding to the node
at the other end of the link. We describe the bit-layout
of this format in detail in Appendix B.
Default format. One source of overhead in the Direct
format is the use of pointers within the header. Our De-
fault format avoids some of that overhead, by grouping
together sequences of labels corresponding to alternate
paths, without needing an explicit representation of each
node along the alternate path. The disadvantage of this
grouping is that it involves duplicating link representa-
tions, similar to how a depth-first traversal of all paths in
the DAG could visit links multiple times.
In fact, there exist DAGs that have exponentially large
numbers of possible traversals (thus specifying exponen-
tially large numbers of ways the packet could be forwarded
through the network). Consequently, the Direct format
can be exponentially more efficient than the approach
of Default in the most extreme case. In general, we ex-
pect Direct will be more compact for situations in which
the alternate paths often share nodes with one another
or with the primary. However, in this paper we focus
on the particular application of choosing single-failure-
avoiding FSes. For that application, we found that the
savings from avoiding pointers outweighed the duplica-
tion of link representations, so that Default was some-
what more compact in several realistic networks (§4). We
therefore choose the Default format as our default and
describe it in more detail now.
In the Default format, the FS is represented as a se-
quence of segments, one for each router on the primary
path. For instance, in Fig. 3, the primary path consists of
k hops and S1, S2, . . . , Sk are the segments corresponding
to those k hops. The segment corresponding to a router v
on the primary path contains three pieces of information
(see Fig. 3): (a) v’s next-hop on the primary path; (b)
the bit-length of the encoding of v’s alternate path; and
(c) v’s alternate path, as a sequence of next-hop labels.
By“v’s alternate path”we mean the alternate path begin-
ning at v that avoids the primary next-hop from v. (We
assume here that the FS has the format of one alternate
path for each link on the primary.2)
For (a), we need to include the router’s label (§3.1) for
the given outgoing edge, and similarly for (c) we include
a sequence of labels. Recall that these labels are only
locally unique to each node, which is critical to achiev-
ing a compact encoding, because the average number of
neighbors of a router in a real-world network is typically
vastly smaller than the total number of routers in the net-
work [3,13]. By exploiting the structure of the real-world
graphs, we are able to reduce the size of the encoding
significantly compared with globally-unique labels.
For (b), we use the two fields: 〈code〉 and 〈length〉.
Here, 〈length〉 specifies the total bit-lengths of all the la-
bels d1, . . . , dℓ of the alternate path. Based on our evalua-
tion, alternate paths are shorter than 32 bits in most cases
and always shorter than 128 bits; in cases a node has no
alternate path, the alternate path bit-length is 0. Thus,
for greater compactness, we make the bit-length of the
〈length〉 field be variable and store it in the 〈code〉 field
using a prefix-free code, with the 〈code〉 bit sequences 0,
10, and 110 mapping to values of 5, 7, and 0, respectively.
The header contains two additional pieces of informa-
tion. First, the SlickPackets header begins with a two
byte field, specifying its header length. Second, a one-
bit field on-alternate? specifies whether the packet is
traversing along the primary path or an alternate path,
and is initially false. We discuss next how routers use this
information to forward packets.
3.4 Forwarding
We now describe the forwarding mechanism used by
SlickPackets routers for the Default format. The input
to this mechanism is the SlickPackets header described
in §3.3, and the output is the interface out which the
packet will be forwarded.
Upon receiving a packet, the router first checks the
value of the SlickPackets header length. If this is 0,
this router is the destination for the packet. If not, the
router checks the on-alternate? bit to see whether it is
on the primary path or on an alternate path. We describe
the forwarding operations for the two cases separately.
Router on the primary path. The router reads the
first segment in the header, which corresponds to itself,
and inspects the primary next-hop label p. If the corre-
sponding link available, the router deletes this first seg-
ment corresponding to itself. It also updates the header
length by subtracting the length of its segment. The
packet is then forwarded to the next-hop on the primary
path with the new header.
If the primary next-hop link is not available, and the
alternate path length is 0, the packet is dropped. Other-
wise, the router reads its next-hop label d1 on the alter-
nate path. If the link corresponding to d1 is not available,
the packet is dropped.3 If the link is available, the router
removes all segments in the header, replacing them by
2While the Default format could be generalized to have
multiple alternates at a router, or segments within seg-
ments to provide alternates for routers along an alternate
path, we do not explore that generalization here; in any
case, such applications can use the Direct format.
3Or any other failure reaction mechanism can be applied.
its remaining alternate path labels (d2, . . . , dℓ). It also
updates the header length appropriately and sets the on-
alternate? bit. The packet is then forwarded to the
next-hop via label d1.
Router on an alternate path. The router reads its
next-hop label. If the corresponding link is not available,
the packet is dropped (or, as earlier, some other failure
reaction mechanism is employed). If the link is available,
the router deletes its label from the header, updates the
header length, and forwards the packet to the next-hop.
Simplifying forwarding operations. The above de-
scription involved removing a prefix of the header, and
in the case of moving to an alternate path, a suffix as
well. In some data plane implementations, these opera-
tions may be costly. In this case, we can simply add start
and end pointers at the front of the header, indicating the
extent of the remaining header. In an extra 3 bytes, we
can fit two pointers that can point to individual bits in a
512-byte header (which is far larger than we need).
Interdomain vs. intradomain issues. In an intrado-
main deployment, we may assume that each router runs
SlickPackets and forwards packets as described above.
However, in an interdomain deployment the forwarding
subgraph roughly represents AS-level paths (as discussed
in more detail in 3.1). When the packet is forwarded
though an intermediate domain, that domain must for-
ward the packet on to the next AS-level hop. Network
operators may independently choose from a variety of
ways to do this, for example by tunneling the packet with
MPLS, or perhaps running SlickPackets internally as
well as interdomain.
4. EVALUATION
SlickPackets advocates the idea of embedding a for-
warding subgraph (FS) in the packet header, giving routers
multiple forwarding options in order to provide the source
with some property that it desires. While SlickPackets
can support flexible FS selections that provide different
guarantees, for concreteness, this section evaluates the FS
selection exemplified in §3.2, which targets fast reaction in
the presence of single-link failures. The source constructs
a DAG comprised of the shortest primary path, and the
shortest alternate path for each node on the primary path
in case that node’s outgoing link along the primary path
fails. In terms of performance, three metrics are impor-
tant: (a) encoding size, (b) failure reaction effectiveness,
and (c) router complexity and packet forwarding rates.
We present results for (a) and (b) in this section and dis-
cuss (c) in §7.
Topologies. We use three network topologies in our
evaluation: the latency-annotated topology from Sprint
ISP 1239 [2], with 315 nodes and 972 links; an AS-level
map of the Internet [13], with 33,508 nodes and 75,001
links; and the largest component, with 190,914 nodes and
607,610 links, of a router-level map of the Internet [1].
The latter two topologies lack latency information; we
take all links to have equal length. While using Slick-
Packets directly on a router-level map of the Internet
is not a likely deployment scenario (due to privacy and
scaling issues, ASes do not propagate internal topologies
globally in today’s Internet), we consider this extreme
design point to investigate scaling issues of our design.
4.1 Encoding size
Since we encode the FS into the packet header, the
encoding size determines the bandwidth overhead. We
evaluate the resulting encoding sizes of the Direct and
Default encoding formats presented in §3.3, for FSes con-
structed using the algorithm presented in §3.2.
Furthermore, regardless of the encoding format used,
the FS size—the number of edges—is a factor influenc-
ing the encoding size. We are thus also interested in com-
paring the sizes of FSes constructed by the algorithm de-
scribed in §3.2 to lower bounds on the sizes of FSes
returned by any algorithm that provides shortest path
latencies and single-link failure protection. These lower
bounds impose a fundamental limit on the encoding size;
intuitively, for a given encoding format that already uses
optimized label lengths, it is hard to reduce the encod-
ing size significantly without reducing the FS size. We
describe in Appendix D an algorithm that yields a lower
bound on the size of the FS for a given primary path
hopcount.
Methodology. We evaluate all 98,910 possible ordered
source-destination pairs of the Sprint topology. For the
AS- and router-level topologies, we randomly sample ten
million unique ordered source-destination pairs. For each
pair, we record these values: the Default and Direct en-
coding sizes, the size of the FS constructed using our al-
gorithm, and the lower bound on FS sizes.
Results. Fig. 4 shows the encoding size results. We see
that Default has somewhat smaller size almost always;
Direct performs noticeably better only in the extreme tail
of the router-level topology. We therefore discuss Default
in what follows. For the intradomain Sprint topology, the
maximum encoding size is 58 bytes. The plot has a long
tail with 90% and 99% of the source-destination pairs
requiring less than 21 bytes and 34 bytes of encoding,
respectively. For the interdomain AS-level map of the
Internet, the maximum encoding size is 50 bytes. As with
the Sprint topology, the plot has a long tail, with 90% of
the source-destination pairs resulting in encodings of less
than 21 bytes; 99% of the source-destination pairs result
in less than 26 bytes.
For the extreme case of router-level topology, 90% of the
source-destination pairs result in encodings of less than 43
bytes; 99% less than 60 bytes. The remaining less than
1% of the source-destination pairs constitute the long tail,
with maximum encoding size of 132 bytes. Although the
router-level realization of SlickPackets may be imprac-
tical, the above results demonstrate that SlickPackets
can scale on graphs as large as 200,000 nodes with mod-
erate increase in the packet header sizes. If desired, this
overhead may be amortized over more data (e.g., by lever-
aging IPv6 jumbo frames) or using SlickPackets only
for application data that is most sensitive to failures.
Fig. 5 shows the FS size (in number of links) and lower
bound. For the AS-level and router-level topologies, our
FS size is very close to the lower bound; for the Sprint
topology, the difference is somewhat larger. Overall, the
results suggest that, for handling single-link failures, our
simple FS selection algorithm is relatively close to optimal
in terms of minimizing the number of links in the FS.
For the Sprint topology, there is also a long tail in both
our FS sizes and the lower bounds. The reason is that
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Figure 4: CDF of SlickPackets encoding size in bytes for the Direct and Default encoding formats, for
handling single-link failures.
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Figure 5: CDF of SlickPackets FS size and the lower bound in number of edges for handling single-link
failures.
there are a few source-destination pairs that have long
primary paths, requiring alternate paths for a large num-
ber of nodes, resulting in larger number of edges.
4.2 Failure reaction effectiveness
One metric to evaluate the effectiveness of a failure re-
action mechanism is the packet stretch, the ratio of the
length of a packet’s path to the length of the shortest
possible path. Previous works calculate stretch based on
packets’ traversed path costs or transit times. However,
for a delay-sensitive application, we are interested in the
time a packet is live from the application’s perspective—
from the time the packet is generated by the source appli-
cation to the time it is received by the destination. Thus,
we define the stretch for a packet that does not fully tra-
verse the original shortest path, to be the ratio of the time
the packet is live to the post-link-failure shortest path la-
tency; for other packets—those that traverse the original
shortest path—the stretch is 1. For brevity of the ensuing
discussion, l0 denotes the failed link on the primary path
from source s to destination d; r0 denotes the router that
is adjacent to and upstream from l0 on the primary path;
and t0 denotes the time of failure of l0.
Modeling delay at network devices. A router in the
network, upon a link failure, has to perform a number of
tasks before it has new valid default next hops for affected
destinations. The four major tasks are: (1) detecting a
failed link (if the router is adjacent to the failed link) and
generating a control plane message; (2) processing of re-
ceived control packets; (3) computing the new shortest
path tree (SPT); and (4) updating the forwarding infor-
mation base (FIB). We assume that the delay in detecting
a failed link is zero since irrespective of the underlying
routing architecture, all packets during this period are
lost;4 this does not make a difference in our performance
comparison results. We consider the three other major
contributors.
Let dr be the time spent by a router in processing
a control packet (i.e., the time between the router’s re-
ceipt and forwarding of the packet). dr (along with link
latencies) dictates the propagation rate of control pack-
ets through the network. Let dp be the delay between a
router’s learning of the link failure and starting a new SPT
computation; dc be the time taken to compute the new
SPT; and du be the time taken to update the FIB. Note
that, upon receiving a control packet, a router necessarily
spends D = (dp + dc + du) time before having new valid
default next hops for affected destinations. The values of
dc and du depend on the router architecture, algorithms
in use, the topology, and the router’s location. Lacking a
good model, we set these values to 0 in our simulations.
However, we use D = dp = 50 ms [18] and dr = 2 ms [8,9]
for the Sprint topology. For the AS-level and router-level
topologies, we use D = dr = 0.
4.2.1 Failure reaction schemes
The performance of source routing protocols also de-
pends on the control plane mechanism: the technique used
to inform sources about the failures in the network. We
describe three variants of SlickPackets design with dif-
ferent control plane mechanisms. We also describe three
4Unless packets are duplicated along multiple paths—a
design point that may be reasonable for certain kinds of
traffic, but which we do not consider in this paper.
protocols—one from the SCR paradigm and two from the
NCR paradigm—that we compare with SlickPackets.
Flooded-SlickPackets. Upon detecting the link fail-
ure, r0 floods the network with a link state advertisement
(LSA). This is similar to running an SCR protocol with
an OSPF [21] style control plane mechanism.
Fast-SlickPackets. When r0 receives a packet whose
primary next-hop traverses l0, it informs s about the
link failure by directly sending an ICMP-style notifica-
tion message to s. The rationale is that, to reduce control
overhead, only sources that use l0 in their primary paths
need to be notified. Intuitively, this significantly reduces
the control plane packets sent into the network.
e2e-SlickPackets. The router r0 piggybacks the link-
failure information on the packet being forwarded on the
alternate path towards d, which, upon receiving this in-
formation, may inform s of the link failure. Thus, failure
information is sent to the source in an end-to-end manner.
All SlickPackets schemes use the same FS selection
algorithm (§3.2) and incur the delay D between learning
of the failure and switching to new primary paths.
Vanilla source routing (VSR). For purposes of com-
parison with SlickPackets, we evaluate a simple“vanilla”
source routing protocol. In VSR, each source s specifies
a single shortest path to its destination d in the packet
header. For the control plane mechanism, we use the
“fast” version, where r0 directly notifies s. After receiving
the notification, s incurs the delay D before computing a
new shortest path. Without a valid path, packets gener-
ated during this time are queued. Packets that use l0 in
their paths will be dropped by r0 after the link failure.
However, once s has computed a new path, it resends the
packets that would have been dropped, i.e., those that it
sent in the time interval [t − R, t) where t is the time s
learned of the failure, and R is the RTT between s and r0.
Note that for some of these resent packets, there could be
two concurrent live copies: the resent copy that will be
delivered along the new path, and the original copy that
will be dropped when it reaches r0. This scheme may be
difficult or undesirable to implement in practice, but as
an idealized VSR, it is a useful comparison.
Ideal-SafeGuard. We simulated an idealized version
of SafeGuard [18], a network-controlled routing protocol
that achieves fast failure reaction. SafeGuard uses the
standard OSPF as the control plane substrate. In Safe-
Guard, r0 immediately uses pre-computed shortest alter-
nate paths to quickly redirect packets that it would other-
wise forward along l0. Other routers recognize redirected
(“escort mode”) packets and forward them along their in-
tended alternate paths; however, until they have updated
their FIBs (after delay D after receiving the LSA), these
routers continue to forward “normal mode” packets along
their sub-optimal paths towards l0. In practice, the “al-
ternative path databases,” which are found to be 2 to 8
times larger than a router’s intradomain FIB [18], might
increase lookup latencies or be an impractical memory
requirement. However, our ideal version of SafeGuard ig-
nores these issues.
Ideal-NCR. This represents an ideal (and unachievable)
NCR scheme, in which each router learns of a link failure
in exactly the propagation delay along the shortest path
from the point of failure to the router; and the router
instantly begins forwarding packets along the shortest al-
ternate path. Ideal-NCR is equivalent to a special case
of Ideal-SafeGuard where all delays, except propagation
delay, are zero (i.e, D = dr = 0).
4.2.2 Methodology
We wrote a static simulator for our evaluation purposes.
The simulator uses the packet stretch computations de-
scribed in Appendix A. Since we are evaluating the re-
action to single-link failures, we evaluate only (l0, s, d)
triples where the primary path from s to d uses l0, and
s and d remain connected after the failure of l0, so that
at least one alternate path to d exists for each router
upstream from l0. For the Sprint topology, we evaluate
all 424,569 possible such triples. For each of the AS- and
router-level topologies, we sample 1,000 random links and
use a sampling algorithm (described in Appendix C) to
obtain over 750,000 and 890,000 such triples, respectively.
In our simulations, the application at the source gener-
ates packets every 1 ms, starting at time t = 0 ms. For
the time of link failure t0, however, recall that in Ideal-
SafeGuard, Ideal-NCR, and Flooded-SlickPackets, r0
floods the LSA when it detects the link failure, not when
it receives sources’ packets. For these schemes, the sooner
the link fails, the sooner intermediate routers and the
source learn of the failure and use better paths. So, for
a fair comparison with non-flooding schemes, we consider
two extreme points: when t0 is greater than the network
diameter in terms of link latencies and when t0 = 0. The
former case ensures that by the time t0, all sources in all
evaluated (l0, s, d) triples have had packets reaching r0.
For the Sprint topology, with a diameter of 139 ms, we
use t0 = 150. For the AS- and router-level topologies, we
assume all links have latencies 1 ms and use t0 = 50.
4.2.3 Results
The high-level results reveal that SlickPackets schemes
(particularly the Fast and Flooded variants) achieve packet
stretch comparable to that of NCR scheme Ideal-SafeGuard.
Although SlickPackets schemes take slightly longer to
converge compared to SafeGuard, they avoid the high
packet stretch of Fast-VSR.
Average stretch. Fig. 6 shows the packet stretch aver-
aged over all evaluated (l0, s, d) triples when t0 is greater
than the network diameter. We first consider features
common to all schemes. For a given scheme, all packets
generated early in the simulation have stretch 1. Grad-
ually, as packets generated closer to t0, as well as more
triples where s is closer to l0, are affected by the fail-
ure, the average stretch increases. Additionally, for any
triple, all packets generated after t0 have stretch no higher
than those generated at t0; this is reflected in the average
stretch over all triples.
We now compare NCR and SlickPackets schemes. In
NCR schemes, routers upstream from l0, once they receive
the LSA and update their FIBs, can redirect packets be-
fore they reach l0; while in SlickPackets schemes, pack-
ets have to reach l0 before being redirected. This differ-
ence gives NCR schemes only a small advantage for early
packets, especially for the Sprint topology in Fig. 6(a),
because upstream routers still incur the delay D between
receiving the LSA and updating their FIBs. For later
packets, this advantage becomes more significant as more
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Figure 6: Average packet stretch - 1 vs. packet generation time when t0 is greater than the network
diameter. The y-axes are on log scales. For the Sprint topology, t0 = 150, D = 50, dr = 2. For the AS- and
router-level topologies, t0 = 50, D = dr = 0.
0 100 200 300 400 500
Packet generation time (ms)
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
10
1
10
2
W
o
rs
t 
st
re
tc
h
 -
 1
(a) Sprint Topology
40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Packet generation time (ms)
10
-1
10
0
10
1
W
o
rs
t 
st
re
tc
h
 -
 1
(b) AS-level Topology
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Packet generation time (ms)
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
10
1
W
o
rs
t 
st
re
tc
h
 -
 1
Fast-SlickPackets
Flooded-SlickPackets
e2e-SlickPackets
Fast-VSR
Ideal-SafeGuard
Ideal-NCR
(c) Router-level Topology
Figure 7: Worst packet stretch vs. packet generation time when t0 is greater than the network diameter.
The y-axes are on log scales. For the Sprint topology, t0 = 150, D = 50, dr = 2. For the AS- and router-level
topologies, t0 = 50, D = dr = 0.
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Figure 8: Average packet stretch - 1 vs. packet generation time when t0 = 0. The y-axes are on log
scales. For the Sprint topology, D = 50, dr = 2. For the AS- and router-level topologies, D = dr = 0.
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Figure 9: Worst packet stretch vs. packet generation time when t0 = 0. The y-axes are on log scales. For
the Sprint topology, D = 50, dr = 2. For the AS- and router-level topologies, D = dr = 0.
upstream routers update their FIBs. As expected, Ideal-
NCR is the best performing scheme in all three topologies:
it converges 57 ms before Ideal-SafeGuard for the Sprint
topology (due to D = 50 and dr = 2) and is equivalent to
Ideal-SafeGuard (not shown) in the other two topologies,
where D = dr = 0.
Consider the SlickPackets schemes in Fig. 6(a). We
see that for packets generated between t0 = 150 and
t0 + D = 200, the average packet stretch is (1) con-
stant within the same scheme and (2) identical across all
schemes. Recall that all SlickPackets schemes use the
same FS selection algorithm and incur the same delay D
between learning of the failure and switching to new pri-
mary paths. Thus, the only factor affecting their relative
performances is the time s learns of the failure, which is
determined by the relative distances among l0, s, and d for
different triples in the same scheme, and the different con-
trol schemes given the same triple. So, regardless of the
(l0, s, d) triple or the control scheme, there is a minimum
window of D time where s uses the same (old) primary
path. After this window, we can see that Fast-SlickPac-
kets converges slightly faster than Flooded-SlickPac-
kets because the LSAs in Flooded-SlickPackets incur
delay dr at intermediate routers; in Fig. 6(b) and (c),
where dr = 0, Fast- and Flooded-SlickPackets are iden-
tical. And both of them converge significantly faster than
e2e-SlickPackets as expected.
Finally, we see that in Fast-VSR, early packets expe-
rience higher stretch than in other schemes. This is be-
cause these packets are dropped and have to be resent
by s. They experience on average a delay of one half the
RTT between s and r0, plus the delay D before being sent
along the new path, resulting in a high stretch. However,
Fast-VSR can catch up to and overtake Fast-SlickPac-
kets for two reasons. First, consider the packet sent 1 ms
before s learns of the failure: in Fast-VSR, it is delayed
(1+D) ms before being resent along the new path; while
in Fast-SlickPackets, the amount of time this packet
traverses the original primary path only to be redirected
backwards can be larger than (1 +D), especially if both
the primary path and alternate path contain a very high
latency link. Second, consider the packet generated 1 ms
before s has a new primary path: in Fast-VSR, it is de-
layed (queued) only 1 ms before being sent on the new
optimal path; while in Fast-SlickPackets, this packet
will be sent along the original primary path and will be
redirected, experiencing a higher stretch than its Fast-
VSR counterpart. These two effects enable Fast-VSR to
noticeably overtake Fast-SlickPackets in Fig. 6(a), but
in Fig. 6(b) and (c), where D = 0 and all links have la-
tencies 1 ms, these two effects are less pronounced.
Worst stretch. Fig. 7 shows the worst stretch of packets
given their generation time, among all evaluated (l0, s, d)
triples, when t0 is greater than the network diameter.
Note that the simulation-wide worst stretches for all schemes
except Fast-VSR are equal, which are 2.93, 2.0, and 2.2
in Fig. 7(a), (b), and (c), respectively. This is because all
these schemes do not drop packets, so the worst stretch
is that of packets that r0 redirects, which is the same for
all these schemes. Also note that for schemes that do
not drop or queue packets, the worst stretch occurs when
a packet traverses the maximum possible distance along
the original shortest path without reaching d, is redirected
back to s, and traverses the shortest alternate path. So, 3
is the upper-bound stretch because the shortest alternate
path cannot be shorter than the original shortest path.
For the Sprint topology in Fig. 7(a), the simulation-
wide worst stretch for Fast-VSR is 27. This happens to
packets sent right before t0 = 150 in triples where s is
close to d, so that the time duration D that these packets
are delayed dominates the latencies of the original and
post-link-failure shortest paths. In the AS- and router-
level topologies, where D = 0, the simulation-wide worst
stretch of Fast-VSR are 2.75 and 2.88 respectively.
When t0 = 0. Fig. 8 and 9 show the results for
when t0 = 0. The overall behavior of each individual
scheme exhibits similar patterns to when t0 is greater than
the network diameter. The differences are that the peak
stretches occur for packets generated at t0 = 0. Further-
more, as expected, flooding schemes benefit from the ear-
lier time of failure: for example, for the Sprint topology in
Fig. 8(a), Ideal-NCR and Ideal-SafeGuard converge fur-
ther ahead of Fast-SlickPackets compared to Fig. 6(a),
and even Flooded-SlickPackets now converges ahead
of Fast-SlickPackets (similarly for the AS- and router-
level topologies).
In terms of simulation-wide worst stretch, those of non-
flooding schemes (Fast- and e2e-SlickPackets as well as
Fast-VSR) are the same as when t0 is greater than the
network diameter. This is as expected because for these
schemes, it is still r0 that redirects packets and/or triggers
the notification of sources. For flooding schemes, however,
it can be expected that simulation-wide worst stretch
would be lower compared to when t0 is greater than the
network diameter. Nevertheless, the Sprint topology con-
tains triples where an upstream link that is close to r0
has very high latency compared to the distance between
s and r0, so that s’s first packet does not benefit from
the flooded LSA: it still has to reach r0 before being redi-
rected. This results in the simulation-wide worst stretch
of 2.93 in Fig. 8(a).
5. DISCUSSION: FORWARDING
SUBGRAPH SELECTION
The SlickPackets design is agnostic to how the source
selects the forwarding subgraph (FS). For example, the
FS selection may be guided by demands of the applica-
tion running at the source (for example, if the source is
an end host) or the performance goals of a network op-
erator (for example, if the source is an edge router). In
this paper, we presented and evaluated one such FS selec-
tion algorithm: where the FS allows re-routing of packets
within the network in case of single-link failures. We now
discuss alternative FS selection strategies.
Handling node failures. For the FS to handle node
failures, we need only a simple modification to the link-
failure-avoiding FS selection of §3.2. A source s, for a
given destination d, constructs the FS in three steps.
First, s computes a primary path P to d by running an
instance of the shortest path algorithm. Next, to protect
against single node failures, s visits each node along P ,
and computes the alternate path Pi it would prefer the
packet to be routed along if that node were to fail. In par-
ticular, for each node vi on the primary path with node
vi+1 as the next hop along the primary path, we (a) re-
move vi+1; (b) compute a shortest path from vi to d; and,
(c) restore vi+1.
Handling multiple link failures. A source may desire
to construct an FS that protects against multiple link
failures. This may be done by extending the scheme from
§3 to construct an FS that protects from multiple edge-
failures. For example, it may be sufficient to have two
strategically chosen alternate paths for all nodes on the
primary path. The idea is that the source can choose
alternate paths that are not failure-correlated with the
primary path. This may allow a much larger amount of
resiliency; although the performance evaluation of such a
scheme is subject to future work.
Congestion avoidance. Our focus in this work so
far has been on dealing with failures. However, alternate
paths in the FS may also be used to react to congestion in
the network. For example, intermediate routers along the
path may choose to forward the packet along an alternate
path if the primary path is congested (e.g., if the inter-
face queue for the corresponding link is filled beyond a
particular threshold). Using a FS also enables the source
to optionally provide control over load balancing, by pro-
viding feedback on which set of paths are tolerable for the
load balancing process.
6. RELATED WORK
Our goals are related to two key areas of related work:
Failure reaction in network-controlled routing pro-
tocols. There has been much work on coping with
failures in IP networks. We focus on the most closely
related work: protocols that guarantee packet delivery
in the presence of one or more link failures. R-BGP [16]
constructs interdomain backup paths to handle single link
failures, given some assumptions about routing policies.
SafeGuard [18] uses a remaining path cost field in a packet
as a heuristic to determine whether the path expected by
the previous hop is different than the path available to the
current hop. In this way, it can decide when to reroute
packets along pre-computed backup paths. FCP [17] takes
a different approach to determining when packets should
be rerouted: each packet carries a list of the failed links
it has encountered. The best backup paths are com-
puted on the fly at routers, thus allowing FCP to be ro-
bust to multiple link failures, but requiring fairly heavy-
weight graph processing in the data plane. MPLS Fast
Reroute [22] relies on precomputation of backup paths. In
its local repair variant, an additional path is constructed
to avoid each neighboring link or node, which can inflate
storage requirements and will not result in lowest-stretch
backup paths. As discussed in the introduction, all of
the above approaches are NCR protocols, which do not
permit source control of primary or backup paths. In
addition, backup paths are computed or stored at every
router within the network, so that there is a dependency
between each router’s forwarding table and the topology
of the entire network.
One way to get a small amount of route control at the
source within an NCR architecture is to use multihoming:
the source can then select between several providers [4].
This could be used to enable some source control, while
still applying the NCR resilience techniques described above.
However, this provides only a very limited amount of con-
trol to the source, and does not yield the full benefits of
source control described in the introduction. Moreover, if
many sources are multihomed, this vastly increases rout-
ing state within the network, since each router would be
required to know about every point of multihoming at-
tachment if we desire to provide alternate paths that avoid
a failure of one of these links.
Our use of routing along FSes was inspired by [19],
which argues that a directed acyclic graph is a better for-
warding architecture than the more traditional shortest-
path tree. While [19] focuses on improving NCR schemes,
we target achieving the benefits of both network- and
source-controlled routing. Additionally, while [19] will
deliver every packet even during link failures, it does not
guarantee the latency that these packets will have. Slick-
Packets can guarantee that for single-link failures, pack-
ets will follow the shortest alternate path from the point
of failure to the destination.
Source routing. There is also a large body of work on
source controlled routing, ranging from dynamic source
routing in wireless networks [15] to future interdomain
routing architectures [10, 20, 29, 30]. Two of these, Rout-
ing Deflections [30] and Path Splicing [20], target fast
re-routing within the network. Both use path label bits
set by the source to pseudorandomly select a next hop at
each router or AS. In [20], pseudorandom forwarding can
lead to forwarding loops. In [30] routers follow certain
rules that ensure loop-freedom, but reduce path diversity.
There are three important differences between [20, 30]
and SlickPackets. First, [20, 30] do not fully support
source control over primary or backup routes; although
sources can select among some set of paths, they can-
not tell which paths they are selecting. Second, although
packets can be rerouted quickly within the network af-
ter a link failure, this is not guaranteed (packets may be
dropped), and the backup paths are not guaranteed to
have optimal latency. Third, [20,30] are similar to tradi-
tional NCR schemes in terms of the state in the network;
indeed, [20] increases forwarding table size because each
router stores multiple next-hops for each destination. In
contrast, SlickPackets enables source control, can guar-
antee resilience5 to single-link failures with packets sent
along the shortest alternate path from the point of failure
to the destination, and requires only local state at routers.
Giving sources control over constructing end-to-end paths
introduces a number of practical questions, for example
in terms of policy compliance, security, and scalability of
disseminating topological state. For these questions, we
rely on previous work (e.g., [10,29], and citations within),
which provide solutions to these problems.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented SlickPackets, an approach
to routing that attains failure reaction, while simultane-
ously retaining the benefits of source routing. Slick-
Packets works by compactly encoding a set of alternate
paths into data packet headers as a directed acyclic graph.
Towards this goal, we provide simple algorithms for com-
puting efficient graphs, and for encoding them into pack-
ets in a manner that can be processed by intermediate
routers in an efficient manner.
5Unless, of course, no alternate path exists.
One major area left for future work is to evaluate the
complexity of implementing SlickPackets in production
routers, and achievable packet forwarding rates; a key
challenge here is dealing with increased header size. A
promising avenue for evaluation is the Supercharged Plan-
etLab Platform [25], a network processor-based platform
on which John DeHart has implemented a prototype ver-
sion of SlickPackets.
This work was supported by National Science Founda-
tion grant CNS 10-40396.
8. REFERENCES
[1] CAIDA’s router-level topology measurements.
http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/skitter/
router_topology/.
[2] Rocketfuel: An ISP topology mapping engine.
http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/networking/
rocketfuel/.
[3] Y.-Y. Ahn, S. Han, H. Kwak, S. Moon, and H. Jeong.
Analysis of topological characteristics of huge online
social networking services. In Proc. ACM WWW’07,
pages 835–844, May 2007.
[4] A. Akella, J. Pang, B. Maggs, S. Seshan, and A. Shaikh.
A comparison of overlay routing and multihoming route
control. ACM SIGCOMM, 34(4):93–106, 2004.
[5] D. G. Andersen, H. Balakrishnan, M. F. Kaashoek, and
R. Morris. Resilient overlay networks. In Proc. 18th
ACM SOSP, October 2001.
[6] M. Caesar, M. Casado, T. Koponen, J. Rexford, and
S. Shenker. Dynamic route computation considered
harmful. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review, 2010.
[7] D. Clark, J. Wroclawski, K. Sollins, and R. Braden.
Tussle in cyberspace: Defining tomorrow’s Internet. In
SIGCOMM, 2002.
[8] P. Francois, C. Filsfils, J. Evans, and O. Bonaventure.
Achieving sub-second IGP convergence in large IP
networks. SIGCOMM Computer Communications
Review, 35:35–44, 2005.
[9] J. Fu, P. Sjodin, and G. Karlsson. Intra-domain routing
convergence with centralized control. Computer
Networks, 53, 2009.
[10] P. B. Godfrey, I. Ganichev, S. Shenker, and I. Stoica.
Pathlet routing. In ACM SIGCOMM, 2009.
[11] K. P. Gummadi, H. V. Madhyastha, S. D. Gribble,
H. M. Levy, and D. Wetherall. Improving the reliability
of Internet paths with one-hop source routing. In Proc.
OSDI, 2004.
[12] J. Hershberger and S. Suri. Vickery prices and shortest
paths: what is an edge worth. In IEEE FOCS, 2001.
[13] Y. Hyun, B. Huffaker, D. Andersen, E. Aben, M. Luckie,
kc claffy, and C. Shannon. The ipv4 routed /24 as links
dataset, November 2010. http://www.caida.org/data/
active/ipv4_routed_topology_aslinks_dataset.xml.
[14] G. Iannaccone, C.-N. Chuah, R. Mortier,
S. Bhattacharyya, and C. Diot. Analysis of link failures
in an IP backbone. In IMC, 2002.
[15] D. Johnson and D. Maltz. Dynamic source routing in ad
hoc wireless networks. Mobile computing, pages 153–181,
1996.
[16] N. Kushman, S. Kandula, D. Katabi, and B. Maggs.
R-BGP: Staying connected in a connected world. In
NSDI, 2007.
[17] K. Lakshminarayanan, M. Caesar, M. Rangan,
T. Anderson, S. Shenker, and I. Stoica. Achieving
convergence-free routing using failure-carrying packets.
SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 37(4):241–252,
2007.
[18] A. Li, X. Yang, and D. Wetherall. Safeguard: Safe
forwarding during route changes. In Proc. ACM CoNext,
December 2009.
[19] J. Liu, J. Rexford, M. Schapira, S. Shenker, and
J. Naous. Routing along DAGs, 2010.
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/∼liujd/RAD.pdf.
[20] M. Motiwala, M. Elmore, N. Feamster, and S. Vempala.
Path splicing. In ACM SIGCOMM, 2008.
[21] J. Moy. OSPF: Anatomy of an Internet Routing
Protocol. 1998.
[22] P. Pan, G. Swallow, and A. Atlas. Fast reroute
extensions to RSVP-TE for LSP tunnels. In RFC4090,
May 2005.
[23] L. Qiu, Y. R. Yang, Y. Zhang, and S. Shenker. On selfish
routing in Internet-like environments. In Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM, pages 151–162, 2003.
[24] S. Savage, T. Anderson, A. Aggarwal, D. Becker,
N. Cardwell, A. Collins, E. Hoffman, J. Snell, A. Vahdat,
G. Voelker, and J. Zahorjan. Detour: Informed Internet
routing and transport. In IEEE Micro, January 1999.
[25] J. Turner, P. Crowley, J. DeHart, A. Freestone,
B. Heller, F. Kuhns, S. Kumar, J. Lockwood, J. Lu,
M. Wilson, C. Wiesman, and D. Zar. Supercharging
planetlab: a high performance, multi-application, overlay
network platform. ACM SIGCOMM, 2007.
[26] F. Wang, Z. M. Mao, J. Wang, L. Gao, and R. Bush. A
measurement study on the impact of routing events on
end-to-end internet path performance. SIGCOMM
Comput. Commun. Rev., 36(4):375–386, 2006.
[27] D. Wendlandt, I. Avramopoulos, D. Andersen, and
J. Rexford. Don’t secure routing protocols, secure data
delivery. In HOTNETS, 2006.
[28] W. Xu and J. Rexford. MIRO: Multi-path Interdomain
ROuting. In SIGCOMM, 2006.
[29] X. Yang, D. Clark, and A. Berger. NIRA: a new
inter-domain routing architecture. IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, 15(4):775–788, 2007.
[30] X. Yang and D. Wetherall. Source selectable path
diversity via routing deflections. In ACM SIGCOMM,
2006.
APPENDIX
A. COMPUTING PACKET STRETCH
We describe here the stretch computations our simula-
tor in §4.2.2 uses. Given a source-destination pair s, d and
a failed link l0 on the primary path between s and d, we
wish to compute the stretch experienced by each packet
that the application at source s generates. We assume
the application at s generates packets every 1ms, start-
ing at time t = 0. Further, we assume that all nodes in
the network have sufficient queue space so that no packet
is dropped for lack of queue space, and that the nodes
can fully flush their queues/buffers instantaneously. We
assume links have sufficient capacity and devices have suf-
ficient data-plane processing capabilities, so that they do
not introduce delays to data packets.
First, we give an overview of our approach (notation
summarized in Table 1). For a given (l0, s, d) triple in
Fig. 10, consider a router r on the primary path that is
upstream from l0. After the failure of l0, router r can
“offer” two types of stretch to packets that reach it: (a)
to packets that r redirects along its alternate path to d, a
fixed stretch σ(r); (b) to packets that r forwards along its
primary path, whatever stretch offered by downstream
routers on the primary path. The two important fea-
tures of a router r are then the time τ (r) at which it
starts redirecting packets along its alternate path, and
Notation Description
l0 a failed link on the primary path from source s to destination d
r0 the node upstream from and adjacent to l0 (r0 might be source s itself)
t0 the time of failure of link l0
tlearn(u) the time a node u learns of the failure, by detecting it or being notified (tlearn(u) ≥ t0)
τ (u) the time a node u can start sending packets along the post-failure shortest path from u to d
σ(u) the stretch experienced by packets that a node u sends along the post-failure shortest path from u to d
dist(u, v) the shortest path latency between nodes u and v with no link failure
d̂ist(u, v, l) the shortest path latency between nodes u and v after the failure of link l
h(u, v) the hop-count between nodes u and v with no link failure
Table 1: Notation used in the packet stretch computations
the fixed stretch σ(r) it offers such redirected packets.
Then, given τ (r), we can compute the sent time of the
first packet from s that will be redirected by r; packets
sent before this packet will be forwarded to r’s primary
next-hop and thus experience whatever stretch offered by
r’s downstream routers. Applying the above analysis to
all routers upstream from l0, our simulator determines
the stretch experienced by any packet given the time it is
generated by the source application.
s ... r1 r0 ... dX
l0
Figure 10: A primary path from s to d with failed
link l0. r0 is the router upstream from and adja-
cent to l0.
A.1 SLICKPACKETS
With all SlickPackets variants, for a particular (l0, s, d)
triple, the only two nodes that potentially redirect pack-
ets are r0 and source s, so we only need to analyse these
two nodes.
Consider r0. It starts redirecting packets at time
τ (r0) = t0. The first packet from s that will be redi-
rected by r0 arrives at r0 at time max{t0,dist(s, r0)} and
thus is sent/generated by s at time
max{t0,dist(s, r0)} − dist(s, r0) (1)
This packet and all packets redirected by r0 experience
its fixed stretch, which is
σ(r0) =
dist(s, r0) + d̂ist(r0, d, l0)
d̂ist(s, d, l0)
(2)
Consider s. It is easy to see that
σ(s) = 1 (3)
To compute the time that s first “redirects” packets—
sends them along its new primary path to d—note that
for all SlickPackets variants, this time is
τ (s) = tlearn(s) +D
Now, we show the derivation of tlearn(s) for each Slick-
Packets variant.
Flooded-SlickPackets. At time t0, when it detects
the link failure—not when it receives packets from source
s—the router r0 floods the network with the LSA. Thus,
s receives the LSA and learns of the link failure at time
tlearn(s) = t0 + dist(r0, s) + h(r0, s) · dr (4)
Fast-SlickPackets. Upon receiving a packet from s
that requires redirection, r0 sends a notification message
to s about the failed link. Thus, s receives the notification
message and learns of the link failure at time
tlearn(s) = max{t0, dist(s, r0)}+ dist(s, r0) (5)
e2e-SlickPackets. Upon receiving a packet from s
that requires redirection, r0 piggybacks the notification
message in the packet on the way to d, which receives the
packet at time max{t0,dist(s, r0)} + d̂ist(r0, d, l0). After
d computes its new shortest path to s, it sends the no-
tification message to s. Thus, s receives the notification
message and learns of the link failure at time
tlearn(s) =max{t0,dist(s, r0)}+ d̂ist(r0, d, l0)
+D + d̂ist(d, s, l0) (6)
A.2 Ideal-SafeGuard
At time t0, when it detects the link failure—not when it
receives packets from s—the router r0 floods the network
with the LSA. As routers upstream from r0 learn about
the link failure, they can potentially redirect packets along
shorter paths, reducing the amount of time packets tra-
verse a sub-optimal path, i.e., packets do not have to reach
the failure before being redirected.
Consider r0. It learns of the link failure at time t0.
Because it has already pre-computed alternate paths to
d, it can immediately redirect packets along the alternate
path. Thus the first packet from s that will be redirected
by r0 arrives at r0 at time max{t0, dist(s, r0)} and thus is
sent/generated by s at time
max{t0,dist(s, r0)} − dist(s, r0) (7)
This packet and all packets redirected by r0 experience
its fixed stretch
σ(r0) =
dist(s, r0) + d̂ist(r0, d, l0)
d̂ist(s, d, l0)
(8)
Consider a node r upstream from r0. (r can be a
router or source s.) It learns of the link failure at time
tlearn(r) = t0 + dist(r0, r) + h(r0, r) · dr
Because it is not adjacent to the failed link, r only starts
redirecting packets along its alternate path to d at time
tlearn(r) +D. Thus, the first packet from s that will be
redirected by r along the alternate path is sent by s at
time
max{0, tlearn(r) +D − dist(s, r)} (9)
This packet and all packets redirected by r experience its
fixed stretch
σ(r) =
dist(s, r) + d̂ist(r, d, l0)
d̂ist(s, d, l0)
(10)
Next, consider two adjacent routers r and r′ upstream
from l0 where r
′ 6= r0 and r is upstream from r
′. Let t and
t′, given by Eq. 9, be the sent times of the first packets
from s that are redirected by r and r′, respectively. Note
that dist(r0, r) > dist(r0, r
′), h(r0, r) > h(r0, r
′), and
dist(s, r) < dist(s, r′); thus t ≥ t′ (t = t′ ⇔ t = t′ = 0). If
t > t′, packets sent by s in the interval [t′, t) are redirected
by r′ and thus experience the stretch offered by r′.
A.3 Fast-VSR
Unlike SlickPackets and SafeGuard, with VSR, the
router r0 drops instead of redirecting packets; source s
has to resend those dropped packets. Also, the only node
that “redirects” packets is source s—it sends them along
a new primary path. Furthermore, s queues packets gen-
erated by the application between the times it learns of
the failure and is ready to use a new path to d. Thus,
we only consider source s, but we consider two types of
packets: those that are dropped and resent, and those
that are queued.
The first packet from s that will arrive at r0 after the
link failure—thus will be dropped by r0 and later resent by
s—arrives at time max{t0,dist(s, r0)} (and thus is origi-
nally sent by s at time max{t0, dist(s, r0)} − dist(s, r0)).
Upon receiving this packet, r0 sends a notification mes-
sage to s, which s receives at time
tlearn(s) = max{t0,dist(s, r0)}+ dist(s, r0)
Thus, s is ready to use a new primary path to d at time
τ (s) = max{t0,dist(s, r0)}+ dist(s, r0) +D
At this time, s instantaneously resends all packets that
would have been dropped. These packets were originally
sent at time
max{t0,dist(s, r0)} − dist(s, r0) + ∆ (11)
with ∆ ∈ [0, 2 ·dist(s, r0)) (recall “[t−R, t)” in §4.2.1) and
thus experience stretch
2 · dist(s, r0)−∆+D + d̂ist(s, d, l0)
d̂ist(s, d, l0)
(12)
For the queued packets, after learning of the failure, s
queues all packets newly generated by the source applica-
tion until it is ready to use a new primary path. These
packets are generated between tlearn(s) and τ (s). In other
words, they are generated at time
tlearn(s) + ∆ (13)
with ∆ ∈ [0, D]. Since s also instantaneously sends all
these queued packets at τ (s), these packets experience
stretch
D −∆+ d̂ist(s, d, l0)
d̂ist(s, d, l0)
(14)
Note that the packet generated at time tlearn(s) +D has
stretch 1, as is expected.
B. DIRECT ENCODING
Direct Encoding embeds the Forwarding Subgraph (FS)
as a directed acyclic graph data structure in the packet
header. At a high level, each router in the FS—except
the destination router because it has no outgoing links—
is encoded exactly once in a structure we call the Nod-
eDescriptor (ND), at some location (bit offset) within
the encoding. A router’s NodeDescriptor (ND) con-
tains SuccessorDescriptor (SD) structures, which rep-
resent the router’s next-hop successor(s). A Successor-
Descriptor (SD) contains (1) the router’s locally unique
link identifier for the next-hop successor and (2) the offset
pointer to the successor’s ND. Finally, the packet header
contains a “current node offset pointer”. A router reads
this pointer to locate its ND, and updates it to point to
the next hop’s offset pointer before forwarding.
We use the overall format:
NodePtrLength CurrentNodePtr ND1 ND2 . . . NDk
NodePtrLength A prefix code that indicates the length
in bits of the CurrentNodePtr field and all other
absolute node pointers. The mappings are 0, 10, 110,
and 1110, for 10, 8, 6, and 4 bits respectively.
CurrentNodePtr This value specifies the bit offset (from
the beginning of the encoding) of the current router’s
ND. The value of zero has a special meaning: the
current router is the final destination/egress router.
An ND can have either one or two SD’s, with the con-
vention that the first successor is the primary one. The
ND has the following format:
NumberOfSuccessors SD1 SD2
NumberOfSuccessors (1 bit) 0 indicates there is one
successor, and 1 indicates there are two successors.
The SD contains two main pieces of information: the
next-hop identifier and the offset pointer to its ND. For
the next-hop identifier, similar to the encoding scheme
discussed in §3.3, we use the router’s locally unique link
identifiers, which it advertises as part of the network map
dissemination. For the offset to the next-hop’s ND, we use
a 1-bit flag to indicate that the next-hop’s ND immedi-
ately follows the current ND; otherwise, we include an
absolute offset pointer to the next-hop’s ND. Here is the
SD format:
LinkId ContainsPtr? Ptr
LinkId The identifier of the link to forward the packet.
The length of this field is specified by the router as
part of the map dissemination. In our encoding size
evaluation (§4.1), we assume that it is ⌈log2∆⌉ bits.
ContainsPtr? (1 bit) 0 indicates that the next-hop’s ND
follows immediately after the current router’s ND.
Ptr Pointer to the next-hop’s ND. The Length of this
field is specified byNodePtrLength discussed above.
The 1-bit flag is only an optimization that allows us to
leave off the offset to the next-hop’s ND. To make this
optimization useful, the encoding algorithm first encodes
all nodes on the primary path one after another. The first
(primary) SD of each of these uses the 1-bit flag because
the successor’s ND immediately follows its own descriptor
(except in the penultimate router’s case, which uses an
absolute pointer value of zero). The second SD, if any,
uses the absolute offset pointer.
After encoding all nodes on the primary path, the en-
coding algorithm picks one of the alternate paths and en-
codes all of its yet-to-be-encoded nodes one after another.
These nodes that are encoded contiguously can use the
relative pointer for their SD’s, and when a node’s next-
hop successor is an already-encoded node, then the next-
hop successor’s offset pointer is used. Also, the penulti-
mate router uses an absolute pointer value of zero in its
SD.
Forwarding Algorithm. Upon receiving a packet,
the router first gets the value of the CurrentNodePtr
(after parsing NodePtrLength). If the value is zero,
then the router is the egress router, and it can perform
appropriate actions on the packet (e.g., delivering it on
attached networks), and it does not forward the packet
further.
If CurrentNodePtr has a non-zero offset value, then
the router parses its ND at that offset. Note, the router
expects that the lengths of its LinkId fields are what it
advertised (e.g., ⌈log2∆⌉ bits). With that information,
the router can fully parse its ND. If the link labeled in
the first SD is online, then the router will use that link
to forward the packet. Otherwise, if there is a second SD
and its link is online, then the router will use that link
to forward the packet. Otherwise, the router drops the
packet.
Before forwarding the packet, the router needs to up-
date the CurrentNodePtr. If the used SD contains an
absolute offset pointer (i.e., its ContainsPtr? flag is
1), then the router updates CurrentNodePtr with the
value in the SD’s Ptr:
CurrentNodePtr← SD.P tr
Otherwise, the successor’s ND follows immediately after
the current router’s ND, so to obtain the successor’s ND
offset, the router adds the total length of its own ND
to its own (CurrentNodePtr) offset, and then updates
CurrentNodePtr with that value:
CurrentNodePtr← |ND|+CurrentNodePtr
C. SAMPLING ALGORITHM FOR SIM-
ULATION
For each sampled link l0, we evaluate“qualified sources”:
those whose shortest path tree (SPT) includes l0. To find
qualified sources, we sample up to 2,000 random sources
and use the first 100 qualified sources, or fewer if we find
fewer qualified sources. For each qualified source s, we
randomly sample 100 destinations from among all those
on the subtree of s’s SPT that uses l0. Finally, among
the sampled destinations, we use only those that remain
connected with s after removing l0.
D. LOWER BOUND ON EDGE-SET SIZE
How much can we reduce the size of the FS by designing
more sophisticated algorithms for selecting the FS? How
close are the results given in §4 to the smallest possible
header for handling single link failures?
In order to be able to answer the above questions, we
derived lower bounds on the edge-set size of FSs that pro-
vide fast failure reaction against single link failures. That
is, for any FS that uses the shortest path between the
source and the destination as the primary path, the lower
bound gives the minimum number of edges that the FS
must contain in order to provide an alternate path avoid-
ing any single-link failure on the primary path. For any
source-destination pair s, d, the lower bound is given as
follows: 

2|P (s, d)|+ 1 if graph weighted
⌈
5|P (s, d)|
2
⌉
if graph unweighted
where P (s, d) is the primary path and |P (s, d)| the num-
ber of edges in P (s, d). These lower bounds impose a
fundamental limitation on the header size of SlickPac-
kets; intuitively, it is hard to reduce the header size (in
bytes) significantly without reducing the edge-set size of
the resulting FS. We prove the lower bound below.
Note that a trivial lower bound on the size of the FS
is 2|P (s, d)| because each node in the primary must have
two outgoing edges in order to provide fast failure reac-
tion against single link failures. Theorem 1 essentially
states this bound along with an example graph demon-
strating that the bound is tight. However, if the graph
is unweighted (all edges have the same weight), we can
provide a better bound: intuitively, the alternate paths
must include extra edges in order to ensure that they are
at least as long as the primary (which is by definition the
shortest). We give this improved bound in Theorem 2.
We assume, in the following proofs, that the graph is not
a multigraph and is 2-connected.
Theorem 1. Suppose the FS uses the shortest path P (s, d)
as the primary path and can avoid any single link fail-
ure along the primary path. Then the FS has at least
2|P (s, d)|+1 edges. Moreover, there exist graphs for which
this bound is tight.
Proof. For weighted graphs, we note that FS contains
|P (s, d)| edges along the shortest path. Furthermore, each
node along the shortest path requires at least one addi-
tional outgoing/incoming edge in order to provide fast
reaction against single link failures. The proof follows by
noting that there are exactly |P (s, d)|+1 nodes along the
shortest path. To prove tightness of the bound, we use
the graph shown in Fig. 11.
Before going to the lower bound proof for unweighted
graphs, we give some definitions to make the discussion
s = v0 v1 v2 vk−2 vk−1 d = vk
u
Figure 11: A graph that achieves the lower bound
on the size of the FS for weighted graphs. The
weight of edges (vi, vi+1) are all 1; the weight of
edges (vi, u) is set to k − i.
more succinct. Let G = (V,E) be the graph and given a
pair of vertices s, d, let FS be the optimal FS, meaning
it has the minimum possible number of edges while satis-
fying the conditions in the theorem. Denote the shortest
path between s and d as
P = P (s, d) = (s = v0, v1, . . . , vk−2, vk−1, vk = d)
and let |P | be the number of edges in P . Let G′ = (V,E′)
be a densest graph (with maximum possible number of
edges) such that P is also the shortest between s and
d in G′ and let FS′ be the optimal forwarding subgraph
between s and d in G′. Let |FS| and |FS′| be the edge-set
size of the optimal forwarding subgraphs FS and FS′. Let
Q(u, v) denote the shortest alternate path (as computed
in §3) between any pair of nodes u and v and N(u) be the
set of neighbors of any node u.
Theorem 2. Under the same conditions as Theorem 1
except that edges have equal weights, the number of edges
in the FS is lower bounded by:⌈
5|P (s, d)|
2
⌉
Moreover, there exist graphs for which the bound is tight.
Proof. We start with a few simple observations: first,
since E ⊆ E′, we have that |FS| ≥ |FS′|. Hence, a lower
bound on |FS′| implies a lower bound on |FS|. Second,
since G′ is unweighted, there is no edge between vi and
vk for any i < k − 1 otherwise P cannot be the shortest
path. Furthermore, to provide fast failure reaction against
single link failures, FS′ must contain an edge (u, vk) for
some u /∈ P since (vk−1, vk) ∈ P and the graph is not a
multigraph.
Consider nodes u and vk−1. Since the graph is not a
multigraph, we have that |Q(vk−1, vk)| ≥ 2. Hence, we
can replace Q(vk−1, vk) by (vk−1, u, vk) without increas-
ing |FS′|; the edge (u, vk) indeed exists as argued earlier.
Now, consider node vk−2. Note that |Q(vk−2, vk)| ≥ 2
and hence, we can replace Q(vk−2, vk) by (vk−2, u, vk) as
earlier.
We make a final observation: let us denote by FS′\P
the set of nodes that are in the FS′ but not in P . We claim
that for any node q ∈ FS′\P , N(q) ∩ P ≤ 3. To prove
this, suppose by way of contradiction that N(q) ∩ P ≥ 4.
Then at least two of the nodes in N(q) are at distance at
least 3 along P , while they are connected via q by just two
hops, contradicting the fact that P is the shortest path.
To summarize, we have shown that for any node q ∈
FS′\P , we have that N(q)∩P ≤ 3. We have also proved
that in the (new) optimal FS, vk−2 and vk−1 are con-
nected to a node u that has a direct link to d. Note that
u ∈ FS′\P and it is already connected to three nodes
in P . Hence, in the (new) optimal FS, we have that ev-
ery node vi ∈ P , i < k − 2 must find an alternate path
to at least one of the nodes vk−2, vk−1, vk or q and can-
not have a direct (alternate) edge to any of these nodes.
We create a new graph G′′ by collapsing the four vertices
(vk−2, vk−1, vk, q) (call this new node d
′); to compute an
optimal FS on G′, we can compute an optimal FS on
G′′ and combine it with the edges between these nodes
that form a part of FS′. Hence, we have reduced our
problem to a strictly smaller subproblem with the same
constraints. This allows us to use a simple recursion. Let
S(n) denote the edge-set size of the optimal FS in G′ with
|P | = n. Then, we get the following recursion:
S(n) ≥ S(n− 2) + 5
which gives us the claimed lower bound on the edge-set
size of the FS. To prove that the bound is indeed tight,
we use the graph shown in Fig. 12.
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Figure 12: A graph that achieves the lower bound
on the size of the FS for unweighted graphs.
